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Pursuant to Rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Defendant/Appellant Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union (hereinafter
"Union"), by and through its attorneys of record, Joseph E. Hatch and Arthur F.
Sandack, file this Reply Brief, as follows:
ARGUMENT
POINT I

A COUPLE OF MIS-DESCRIBED FACTS.

Except for the different uses of adjectives and adverbs, there is little dispute
between the parties as to the factual background of this case. Of course, the parties
strongly disagree on the facts and circumstances surrounding the issue of whether or
not the Plaintiff/Appellee Utah Transit Authority (hereinafter "UTA") had violated
state law by failing to bargain with the Union in good faith. However, those disputed
facts are not for resolution with this appeal.
Despite a concurrence in the description of the facts, the Union believes that
the UTA mis-described two relevant facts in its Brief. First, on page 9 of its Brief,
the UTA asserts that.. ."there was no collective bargaining agreement in effect at the
time that this case was initiated in the district court..." In other words, the UTA
argues that the C.B.A. between the parties had "expired" on December 21, 2009. The
Union submitted that the C.B.A. had not "expired". Therefore, a C.B.A. did exist
when the UTA filed the subject declaratory judgment action in state court.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The above dispute over whether or not the C.B.A. had expired on December
21, 2009, was arbitrated by the parties and Arbitrator Axon ruled that the C.B.A. had
not expired. His ruling specifically found that the UTA violated the Section 13(c)
Arrangement by imposing terms and conditions of employment on December 21,
2009, and awarded that "all terms and conditions of the expired Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall be made retroactive to December 21, 2009." (See page
35 of the Arbitrator Board's Opinion and Award dated December 11, 2010). This
means that, on the date that the UTA filed this declaratory judgment action, the
parties were subject to a C.B.A. and therefore party to two separate agreements with
arbitration clauses.
Although the Union with its motion to compel arbitration did not raise the
arbitration clause contained in the "expired" C.B.A., this does not mean that in the
future the Union would not argue that certain unfair labor practices could be a
violation of the C.B.A. and subject to arbitration pursuant to the parties' C.B.A. This
point was specifically presented to the trial court during oral argument on this matter.
(See pp. 6-7 of R. 741).
Secondly, also on page 9 of the UTA's Brief, it is stated that "[pjursuant to the
13(c) arrangement, either UTA or the Union has the option of involving "factfinding" proceedings in the event that the parties are not able to reach agreement after
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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60 days of bargaining over a collective bargaining agreement." This position by the
UTA has been expressly rejected by Arbitrator Axon in his decision.
Under the Section 13(c) Arrangement, "fact-finding" can not be invoked until
60 days after a "labor dispute" arises "regarding the making or maintaining of a
collective bargaining agreement". The UTA has argued that such a labor dispute
exists the moment the parties sit down to discuss the terms for a new C.B.A.; the
Union showed that a labor dispute, for purposes of invoking "fact-finding", does not
arise until the UTA stopped making any meaningful proposals during a negotiation.
Because of Arbitrator Axon's decision, the parties could not have invoked the
"fact-finding" provisions of the Section 13(c) Arrangement in October of 2009, as
alleged by the UTA, but would have had to wait until January 12, 2010. This is
important because it demonstrates how the UTA rushed unilaterally to declare
impasse and to imposing terms and conditions of employment three weeks before
either party could have even invoked "fact-finding". It is the facts and circumstances
behind this UTA rush to declare impasse and otherwise refusal to bargain which the
Union desires to have an arbitrator decide whether or not there was a violation of the
Section 13(c) Arrangement.
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POINT II

THIS CASE IS NOT M O O T ,

The first matter that this Court must decide is whether, in light of several postappeal events, the UTA's suggestion of mootness is well taken. Although their
suggestion was well presented in the memorandum filed by both parties, the UTA
raised a number of new points with its Brief upon which the Union desires to
comment.
First, the UTA has altered its request of this Court since the UTA filed the
suggestion of mootness. In the submittal, the UTA plead that.. ."there is no longer
any meaningful relief that can be granted, and the appeal is moot and should be
dismissed." (See page 2 of Appellee's Suggestion of Mootness dated July 8, 2011).
However, with its Brief, the UTA now argues
that the substantive dispute in labor practices was rendered moot by
the decision of Arbitrator Axon in the arbitration conducted pursuant
to the 13(c) Arrangement, and that this Court should only decide only
the procedural issue and then dismiss the case as moot.
(See p. 30 of Brief of Appellee.) Although the Union welcomes this change in views
by the UTA, the Union, of course, does not believe the change in views goes far
enough. The Union, as was articulated in its memorandum filed with this Court, still
believes that the facts and circumstances, surrounding the UTA's rush to declare
impasse and then its inappropriate and unilateral imposing terms and conditions of
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employment, are still ripe for arbitration and it is solely within the purview of the
arbitrator to decide. Whether or not the substantive issues raised by the allegation,
that the UTA had failed to negotiate in good faith, are moot is for an arbitrator to
decide. Courts have no authority to delve into or on the merits of issues subject to
arbitration. Mootness is a court fashioned doctrine that applies to cases properly
before the court on its merits.
Second, the UTA is wrong when it asserts that there are no remedies available
for the UTA's alleged failure to bargain in good faith with the Union. Although it is
correct that the most common remedy, restoration of status quo ante, has been
ordered; other significant remedies, as described in the Union's filed memorandum,
are available. Possibly the most significant remedy, a cease and desist order, is
available for an arbitrator to describe expressly, using the facts and circumstances
between August 2009 and December 21, 2009, to determine what is meant by good
faith collective bargaining under Utah laws.
Third, the public policy reasons why this Court should rule upon the procedural
issues of this case, as is advocated by both the UTA and Union, equally apply to why
it is important for both parties to fully understand what behavior is expected of them
when negotiating the terms and conditions of a new collective bargaining agreement.
The citizens of this state have the right to expect that both the Union and UTA will
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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engage in good faith bargaining and to benefit from the resulting labor peace and
higher productivity which are the products of successful collective bargaining.
Fourth, although Arbitrator Axon has definitively defined some of the rules for
collective bargaining between the Union and the UTA, this does not mean that there
are no longer significant disputes between the parties, resolution of which will assist
any future negotiations. The UTA engaged in certain negotiation tactics during 2009.
The Union has argued that those tactics, taken as a whole, constituted bad faith
bargaining. Nothing has happened which would render any of those negotiating
tactics, with the exception of imposing terms and conditions of employment prior to
the utilization of fact-finding, as legally inappropriate until an arbitrator or a court
rules in this case. Those issues were not before Arbitrator Axon.
Finally, it is true that the Union has not answered the complaint or
counterclaim with any action alleging unfair labor practices. All the Union did was
to move for a stay of the district court proceedings and to compel arbitration of its
grievance and issues before the court including UTA's allegations that it was entitled
to unilaterally implement new terms of employment because it had bargained in good
faith to impasse. If the UTA believes its court complaint is moot, it would be free to
dismiss the complaint, should the UTA's claims be subject to the court's jurisdiction.
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For these reasons and other previously addressed by the Union, the Court
should not determine the matter as moot.

POINT III

THE UTA IS MISINTERPRETING JACKSON TRANSIT.

UTA's principal contention is that the U.S. Supreme Court case
of Jackson Transit requires that labor disputes, involving good faith
collective bargaining, m u s t to be litigated in state court and are not
subject to arbitration. This argument is entirely lacking in merit.
Jackson Transit says nothing about abrogating state law compelling
arbitration p u r s u a n t to a Section 13(c) Arrangement or pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement. Quite the contrary, arbitration is a
fundamental and widely accepted tool for resolving labor disputes. In
this controversy, arbitration was determined by the Secretary of Labor
to be the forum where such a good faith bargaining labor dispute is to
be resolved.
The Union did not attempt "to minimize" the Jackson Transit ruling in its brief
as UTA claims at page 14 of its Brief. Rather, the Union cited to Jackson Transit to
provide the legal landscape for this dispute and why the Union was required to
enforce the arbitration provisions of the Section 13(c) Arrangement in state court
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

rather than in federal court. Jackson Transit holds there is no federal-question
jurisdiction to enforce arrangements or collective bargaining agreements under § 13c
the Urban Mass Transportation Act, 49 USC § 5333(b) (herein "UMTA"). Even the
UTA's review of this case, when it is boiled down, stands for nothing more than this.
However, the UTA claims much more by making unsupported assertions on
pages 18-19 of its Brief where the UTA states:
Given the Supreme Court's express direction in Jackson
Transit, it is plain that the Union's demand to arbitrate the
underlying dispute in this case - that is, whether UTA bargained
in good faith to the point of impasse- directly contravenes the
intent of congress and cannot be granted. On the contrary, this
is manifestly an issue of state law that must be decided by state
courts.
UTA continues on page 19 of its Brief to contend that the Union, in seeking an order
compelling arbitration,
ignores the Supreme Court's direction in Jackson Transit and instead
points to UTA's 13(c) Arrangement, which includes a requirement
that UTA provide for the continuation of collective bargaining, as an
arbitration clause. Indeed, the Union quotes language from the 13(c)
Arrangement [at \3] that, taken out of context, appears to create an
independent duty to collectively bargain with the Union ... The Union
then cites to the 13(c) Arrangement's arbitration clause, and argues
that the UTA must arbitrate the issue of whether it bargained in good
faith, as if ^[3 of the 13(c) Arrangement somehow preempts the [Utah]
statutory requirement [for collective bargaining] found in Section 813.
UTA asserts that arbitration "would frustrate the intent of the UMTA (as explained
by the Supreme Court) and would interfere in the orderly development of Utah labor
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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law" such that allowing arbitration would "effectively cede control of state labor laws
to the federal government, contrary to the... decision of Jackson Transit.''(See UTA's
Brief, pp. 19-20).
UTA has grossly mischaracterized the Union's position. The Union did not
ignore directions in Jackson Transit. It in fact asked the state court to enforce the
arbitration agreement rather than attempt to remove the case to federal court. Jackson
Transit says nothing about usurping state arbitration law; if anything that case
supports state arbitration laws. The Union is not trying to pre-empt state collective a
bargaining law but trying to enforce the law through a motion to compel arbitration
the provisions of the Section 13(c) Arrangement as the Secretary of Labor
specifically required.
UTA entirely fails to connect the dots between what it says Jackson Transit
does and what UTA claims for it, that litigation of the collective bargaining dispute
regarding a state law is required to be enforced in state court, regardless of any
independent duty under the Section 13(c) Arrangement to arbitrate it.
If UTA's contentions are accepted, there would be no place for arbitration of
collective bargaining disputes, even under collective bargaining agreements. UTA
could always claim a right to take any transit employment action toward represented
employees under state collective bargaining law that only a court could determine if it
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was lawful. This flies in the face of state and federal policies determining arbitration
to be a favored remedy which courts should enforce liberally, as discussed at pages
26-27 of the Union's Brief.
The United States Supreme Court has as well stated that the grievance
arbitration procedure is
the very heart of the system of industrial self government.
Arbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by
molding a system of private law for all the problems which may
arise and to provide for all their solution in a way which will
generally accord with the variant needs and desires of the
parties. The processing of disputes through the grievance
machinery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and content
is given to the collective bargaining agreement.
.. .The grievance procedure is, in other words, a part of the
continuous collective bargaining process.
Steelworkers v Warrior Gulf& Navigation Company 363 US 574, 581 (1960).
Certainly the Secretary of Labor knew arbitration's place by including it in the
Section 13(c) Arrangement which UTA agreed by accepting substantial federal
transportation grants. If the UTA does not want to arbitrate, it could have always
sought to eliminate the clause by asking the Secretary of Labor to change the
Arrangement in that regard. However, it is improper for the UTA to ask the court to
eviscerate the arbitration clause.
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Jackson Transit arose out of an action against the Secretaries of Labor and
Transportation for their alleged failure to carry out their duty under the 13(c)
protections of the UTMA and enforce a collective bargaining agreement which
Jackson City allegedly unlawfully abrogated.
In Jackson Transit, the U.S. District Court found the Secretaries of Labor and
Transportation were not parties to the C.B.A. and had no continuing duty to enforce
the C.B.A. under the 13(c) Arrangement. See 447 F Supp 88 at 91-92. The district
court held there was no federal-question jurisdiction for the Union's claims against
the Secretaries and no pendant jurisdiction against the city of Jackson to enforce the
C.B.A. or its arbitration provision. The District Court found the action did not give
rise to a claim for breach of the UMTA, itself, which was intended "only secondarily"
to protect collective bargaining rights. Id at 93. The District Court stated that the
overwhelming case law held that the "Union's right of action draws its vitality from
the collective bargaining agreement, enforceable under state law, rather than the
provisions of the UMTA." 447 F Supp 88 at 94. The District Court added:
Moreover, this court is convinced that plaintiffs right of
collective bargaining will not be lost if this matter is left to state
law on the basis of a breach of contract or arbitration claim....
This court is' not inclined to find that federal law has preempted state remedies as claimed by plaintiff. Tennessee Code
Annotated (citation omitted)... specifically authorizes
Tennessee cities and transit authorities, such as those involved
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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here, to arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of any collective
bargaining agreement, (underlining added)
447 F Supp at 94.
Thus, the District Court recognized the role of the state in enforcing arbitration
agreements. While the Utah transit statute does not expressly authorize arbitration as
Tennessee does, Utah does implicitly recognize arbitration as part of the "remedies of
the 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act...., as determined by the Secretary of
Labor" that apply to the Utah public transportation system. See U.C.A. § 17B-2a813(1).
The Federal Court of Appeals reversed the District Court finding federalquestion jurisdiction allowing for a private cause of action, as supported by numerous
decisions, to enforce interest arbitration awards. It found that the Jackson Transit
dispute indeed presented even a stronger federal question because the UMTA did not
explicitly require interest arbitration, as enforced in the other cases, but the UMTA
did require "collective bargaining rights." 650 F 2d 1379 at 1383. (CA 6 1981)
The US Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals holding that 13(c) of the
UMTA does not establish federal causes of action for alleged breached that statute or
collective bargaining contracts contemplated under the statute. It stated u[t]he precise
question before us is whether the union's contract is a federal cause of action, not
whether the union can bring suit at all to enforce its contracts." 457 U.S. at 21. The
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i?

court concluded based on the legislative history, that Congress intended labor
relations between transit workers and a local government receiving federal transit aid
to be controlled by state law. 457 U.S. at 24. "Congress intended that 13(c) would be
an important tool to protect collective bargaining rights of transit workers, by
ensuring that state law preserved their rights before federal aid could be used could be
used to convert private companies into public entities." 457 U.S. at 27-28 (1982).
Accordingly the court held it could not "read 13(c) agreements to create federal cause
of action for breaches of § 13(c) agreements and collective bargaining contracts
between UMTA recipients and transit unions." 457 U.S. at 29.
Nowhere does Jackson Transit hold or even suggest that the Supreme Court
was supplanting the role of arbitration as a means of enforcement. Nor could the
Supreme Court do this, as it recognized the question was not within its jurisdiction.
Incredulously, UTA argues at page 20-2 1 of its Brief that Paragraph %3 of the
Section 13(c) Arrangement is a "belt and suspenders" provision "that would only
come into play if there were no applicable state statute" providing for collective
bargaining. Whatever is meant by the term "belt and suspenders", this argument is
nonsensical. If Utah had no collective bargaining rights for transit workers, there
would be no f3 because there would be no Section 13(c) Arrangement because there
would be no federal transit aid under the UMTA.
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The UTA and the state of Utah clearly understands the necessity of a state law
enabling collective bargaining rights for transit workers to obtain federal grants to
support the transit projects. Utah has set them forth in the statute in bare bones
fashion. As UTA recognizes in its discussion of the Donovan case at page 18 of its
brief, state law must incorporate basic federal policy which "require at a minimum
good faith negotiations, to the point of impasse." And the federal policy requiring
arbitration is explicitly set forth in the Section 13(c) Arrangement at ^[8.
Nevertheless at pages 23-24 of its brief, UTA argues it never agreed to arbitrate
claimed violations of Section 813 of Utah law establishing collective bargaining
rights. Yet UTA recognizes this statutory provision was the very condition for federal
financial assistance. See pages 15-16 of its Brief. And such rights are exactly what
the Section 13(c) Arrangement at ^[3 preserves and protects in giving the aid, when it
states "[t]he collective bargaining rights of employees represented by the Union
including the right to arbitrate or otherwise resolve labor disputes..., as provided by
applicable laws policies and/or existing collective bargaining agreements shall be
preserved and protected

The Public Body [UTA] agrees, that it will bargain

collectively with the Union..."
Accordingly, the Union submits the Court should enforce the Section 13(c) Arrangement by
requiring arbitration of the good faith bargaining issues pursuant to state law.
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POINT IV

ARBITRATION IS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH THE INTENT OF
CONGRESS,

UTA next falls back on unsupported claims and shotgun arguments at pp. 2229 of its Brief to claim that arbitration conflicts with congressional policy as declared
by the Supreme Court. Among its contentions the UTA claims it has never agreed to
arbitrate the Union's grievance, that out of state arbitrators lack special expertise on
bargaining issues or are ill equipped to apply Utah law, and that allowing arbitrators
to decide other cases is contrary to Utah public policy. It goes so far as to argue the
merits of the case, that the district court reserved for trial, which the UTA did bargain
in good faith.1 See pp. 28-29 of UTA's Brief.
The Union has already addressed the contentions that arbitration is indeed
favored by public policy and the UTA agreed to arbitrate the dispute. The other
arguments have nothing to do with the real issue on appeal but are briefly addressed.
If labor arbitrators are so deficient and ill equipped, why would the Secretary of
Labor require arbitration at ^[8 of the Arrangement? The Secretary has the labor
expertise to have confidence in the disputes resolution process.
The NLRB as well by established policy, routinely defers to labor arbitrators on
unfair labor charges for failure to bargain under its Collyer doctrine. See Collyer
Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971).
The District Court only granted partial summary judgment on the issue as to whether the dispute was arbitrable
not whether it bargained in good faith to impasse or was entitled to implement new terms.
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There is no need to get into a prolonged discussion of Collyer, or the evidence,
or lack thereof, of the expertise of arbitrators in address these issues. The
Arrangement calls for arbitration of "any labor dispute or controversy ... regarding
the application, interpretation or enforcement of this Arrangement." This collective
bargaining dispute is grist for the mill of that remedial process and exactly what was
intended for it. It is not for the court to substitute its judgment for the Secretary of
Labor when it comes to determining if it is appropriate or not in the Arrangement
which UTA accepted.
CONCULSION
For the reasons advanced in its Briefs, the Union request this Court
reverse the Order of the District Court, compel arbitration of the labor dispute
between the UTA and the Union, and stay the district proceedings until the arbitration
has been completed.
Respectfully submitted this

day of October, 2011.

JOSEPH E. HATCH

Attorney for the Union
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on the

day of October, 2011,1 caused two true and

correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be mailed, postage
prepaid, addressed to:
Scott A. Hagen
D. Zachary Wiseman
David B. Dibble
Ray Quinny & Nebeker, P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385
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